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Abstract 
Based on field research in Africa, this essay explores three claims: first, that sport 
hunting places economic value on wildlife and habitats; second, that this motivates 
conservation practices in the interest of sustaining revenue sources; and, third, that 
this benefits human populations. If true, then sport hunting may sometimes be 
justifiable on utilitarian grounds. While not dismissing objections from the likes of 
Singer and Regan, we suggest their views – if converted into policy in desperately 
impoverished places – would destroy animals and the habitats on which they depend. 
There are empirical verifications of this, which we discuss. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This essay is a précis for a larger project underway on the ethics and 
economics of sport hunting. More specifically, it is based on field 
research, and aims at testing the claims: 
1. That sport hunting places economic value on wildlife and 
habitats. 
2. That this motivates conservation practices in order to maintain 
business enterprises, however distasteful sport hunting may be. 
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3. That this, in turn, benefits local human populations. 
 
The field research – presented in a number of case studies – 
specifically focuses on regions of Namibia, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe. While some of the findings suggest that sport hunting can 
have the benefits just outlined, political opposition in the name of 
conservation thwarts such practices. So without necessarily challenging 
philosophical outlooks that would forbid sport hunting such as those 
advanced by Jeremy Bentham [1], Peter Singer [12], and Tom Regan [9], 
the case studies presented suggest that these positions, if enacted in 
policy, can have the counterintuitive effect of destroying that which 
they seek to protect, in this case, animals and the habitats on which 
they depend. 
 
II. Case Study 1: Zimbabwe’s Zambezi Valley 
 
The first case study focuses on northern Zimbabwe’s Zambezi Valley, 
specifically the Mbire District in the Dande region, an area bordering 
Zambia and Mozambique. This region has long suffered from 
poaching, which employs indiscriminate methods such as snares and 
poison, stripping the land of game. Porous and unpatrolled boarders 
make matters worse. At the same time, rampant killing of animals is 
bad for the hunting business, and those running legal operations have a 
vested interest in preventing it.  
In line with this, the sport hunting operation we observed – 
Charlton McCallum Safaris – has gone to lengths to thwart poaching. 
Measures include funding anti-poaching patrols, and establishing 
reward systems for captured snares, poachers, hunting equipment and 
so forth. These measures appear effective, so that during our brief 
research visit, we witnessed a leopard poacher arrested and another 
convicted for killing a juvenile elephant. The anti-poaching patrol we 
travelled with also removed numerous snares during our stay, with 
approximately 6.500 seized between 2014 and 2016.   
It is important to note that overhunting is bad for business. 
Consequently, the sport hunting carried out here is not the mass 
slaughters that we picture when thinking of colonial adventurers – the 
sort detailed in books such as Theodore Roosevelt’s African Game Trails 
[11]. Quotas restrict the numbers killed. So do prices that clients pay 
for hunts, sometimes exceeding $110.000. In the 457.000 acre area in 
Debating Public Policy 
 
189 
which Charlton McCallum Safaris operate, the number legally hunted 
accordingly pales in comparison to poaching levels prior to the 
introduction of regulated trophy hunting. This is enough so, for 
example, that with anti-poaching measures the total amount of 
elephants killed has dropped. Thus in 2010 – the year Charlton 
McCallum Safaris established the Dande Anti-Poaching Unit or DAPU 
– 40 poached elephant carcasses were found from the previous season. 
By 2013, the number was down to four, with amounts fluctuating in 
subsequent years, but remaining below 10. The number hunted on legal 
safaris, by contrast, averaged 11.25 per year from 2013 onward. This 
means that in even the most egregious years, the number of animals 
killed was roughly half of that occurring in the year prior to the 
introduction of DAPA.   
Species accordingly appear to benefit, and advantages also accrue to 
human populations, enough so that the local government pays half the 
salaries of DAPU scouts, with Charlton McCallum Safaris covering the 
remainder, plus food and equipment. This makes economic sense since 
hunting realizes 90% of revenues in the Mbire District, with locals 
prospering from jobs that would otherwise be absent, along with lease 
payments. Just as importantly, future generations should yield benefits 
from the continued existence of wildlife and habitats that would 
otherwise be destroyed.   
 
III. Case Study 2: Namibia Ranch Country 
 
The second case study differs from the first insofar as land is not leased 
from local indigenous populations, but owned by ranchers in 
northwestern Namibia. In at least the short term, ranchers’ interests 
tend to conflict with wildlife conservation. However, the introduction 
of sport hunting generates enough revenue to compensate for losses 
caused by wildlife, and in this way motivates a conservation spirit. 
One problem ranchers face is elephants breaking through fences, 
allowing breeding stock to mix. Elephants also destroy watering holes. 
Another common challenge is predators eating stock. Hence both have 
historically been shot. The introduction of sport hunting, however, 
markedly alters the situation, assuring profits exceeding damages, even 
for ranchers not directly involved in safari operations. This, in turn, 
dissuades them from shooting so called “problem animals” in the 
650.000 acre Loxodonta Africana Conservancy jointly established by 
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them for regulated sport hunting on their lands. As in the Zambezi 
case, moreover, only small numbers – for example, one or two 
elephants every five years – are hunted. 
The situation is of course optimal when ranching is mostly 
abandoned in favour of using lands for sport hunting, with ecosystems 
benefiting from the removal of cattle, which strip vegetation, thus 
harming wildlife. Such is the case in the 37.000 acre parcel run by 
Westfalen Hunting Safaris that we observed. Moreover, it is not just the 
removal of cattle that yields benefits. Operators also cultivate wildlife – 
including giraffe, oryx, springbok, warthog, zebra and other species 
hunted – by putting out saltlicks and alfalfa pellets for animals and by 
maintaining waterholes, which are essential, more so during increasingly 
common droughts. The co-owner of Westfalen Hunting Safaris, John 
Westhuizen, further notes that sport hunting – which he incidentally 
does not enjoy – is more profitable than raising cattle, particularly in 
times of drought. Notice, moreover, that animals will be killed even if 
owners opt exclusively for ranching, only in this case it will be cattle 
raised for slaughter, plus wildlife extinguished because of stripped 
vegetation, making the total number higher. 
Although most of the financial benefits accrue to affluent 
landowners, who happen to be overwhelmingly white, this does not 
diminish the fact that wildlife and habitats are preserved.  Financial 
rewards, moreover, would still go disproportionately to land owners if 
they engaged in ranching instead of sport hunting, just as it goes 
disproportionately to those who already have much in every society. 
That this is so, in any case, does not obviate the fact that poorer black 
populations nonetheless benefit. This is not so much because more 
jobs are created, although this happens in times of expansion. Rather, it 
is because jobs are higher skilled and hence better paying.  In addition 
to this, uniforms, shelter and meat are supplied to workers and local 
schools, with about four tons donated annually by Westfalen Safaris 
alone. Because of the environmentally destructive nature of ranching, 
and for other reasons stated, changing to sport hunting – in addition to 
benefiting locals – conserves habitats and wildlife for future 
generations. 
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IV. Case Study 3: Makuya Lands 
 
The third case of sport hunting – this time in Makuya lands in South 
Africa along the Mozambique and Zimbabwe boarders – appears less 
successful in terms of achieving conservation goals. Here tribespeople 
control both the hunting rights and the land abutting Kruger National 
Park, a protected area from which game wanders onto their territory.   
A problem here is that one group in common controls the land, and 
the same group has access to it, with little incentive against illegal 
hunting since individuals are rarely held responsible, and since, from 
their perspective, there is almost unlimited game passing onto their 
territory from Kruger. As if to exemplify this, our hosts boasted in 
front of tribal leaders that they served us poached buffalo after drinks 
had loosened tongues. When touring the land, we observed lower 
densities and less variety of animals than when in Namibia, which is 
shocking given the proximity to Kruger Park, although more thorough 
surveys over longer periods would be needed to determine the extent to 
which this is actually so. Another problem with the Makuya operation is 
that revenues earned from hunting appear to be funneled 
disproportionately to local elites, though this is hard to ascertain for 
certain. To some extent, this is the case everywhere, but the difficulty 
appears worse here. 
 
V. Political Obstacles 
 
Though sport hunting is not always beneficial, there are cases in which 
it is, as in the Zambezi and Namibia examples. Be this as it may, 
political agendas tend to thwart even these beneficial arrangements.   
As an illustrating example, one might consider the 2014 Dallas 
Safari Club auction of the right to hunt a black rhinoceros bull from a 
national park in Namibia. A wealthy Texan named Corey Knowlton 
won the bid, paying $350.000 to hunt this critically-endangered species. 
Interestingly, after the auction, Knowlton declared that he was unhappy 
with the result.  He anticipated (and wished for) a much higher price. 
However, weeks of negative publicity had scared off potential bidders. 
Perhaps more interestingly, Knowlton wondered why individuals or 
organizations so repulsed by the potential killing had not bothered to 
bid and then simply opted not to shoot the animal. He suggested that 
this – with the broader anti-hunting venom – detracted from 
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conservation aims by lowering the value of the animals and hence local 
motivation and capacity to protect them. 
A parallel example involves land within Kruger National Park which 
after much political wrangling, was restored to the Makuleke, with 
rights granted to any commercial ventures in the area as long as they 
coincided with the conservation efforts of the park itself. The most 
obvious prohibited activities included homebuilding, mining or farming 
within the “contractual park” [13]. Notably, commercial trophy hunting 
was permitted and took place in an effort to raise revenues, in turn used 
for community development projects and to pursue an eco-tourism 
arrangement, eventually carried out without hunting. The projections 
were an estimated 150 jobs, paying $400 per month [7], a very good 
wage by South African standards. While unpalatable to many, it should 
be made clear that hunting revenue allowed the construction of several 
lodges within the area which serve today as a source of funds for the 
community [10]. The trophy hunting, of course, received abundant 
criticism, likely more so because the activity was taking place within the 
crown jewel of African national parks – an area, however, subject to 
occasional culls due to overpopulation that is not only unsustainable 
but also stressing local vegetation [4]. In circumstances similar to the 
Knowlton incident, an uproar ensued, and consequently only a handful 
of hunts occurred, nonetheless yielding roughly $500.000 revenue [2, 6, 
9]. 
It is important to note community involvement nonetheless 
protected the area to an extent that Kruger National Park elected to 
relocate rhinos into it. More recently, however, the Makuleke have 
come to see politically fuelled conservation pressures as a hindrance. 
This is directly related to the reality that revenue has dropped as 
hunting has become too politically unpopular as a management option. 
Further, the imposition of less profitable luxury lodges is not without 
ecological impact. Without sufficient revenue, one wonders about the 
long-term prospects for local wildlife [3], though in this case matters 
should at least be mitigated by the fact that these lands lie within 
Kruger. 
 
VI. Ethics and Policy 
 
One premise advanced throughout is that human populations stress 
non-human habitats.  Land is generally used one way or another. Cattle 
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farming, for example, is extremely harmful to habitats and the entire 
planet insofar as it contributes to climate change, water pollution and 
depletion, vegetation destruction and more. Growing crops also 
damages wildlife habitats and contaminates water with pesticides and 
fertilizers, among much else. Sport hunting obviously kills wildlife too.  
In all cases, accordingly, animals die.   
Anti-hunters, moreover, cannot protect animals without a sufficient 
revenue source, and will inevitably “sell” some animals and let them 
die, even if merely opting to protect some over others. Sport hunting, 
as carried out in the first two case studies, is less destructive to habitats 
and wildlife in comparison to farming and perhaps in comparison to 
not doing anything since unoccupied land is more vulnerable to 
poaching. Conversely, wildlife plummets have been documented 
following hunting bans, as in Kenya from the late 1970s onwards [8]. 
Reasons are complicated, some independent of hunting or its absence, 
as with increases in human population and consequent strains on 
habitats. However, bans can relate directly to wildlife destruction, as 
when environmental stresses follow because people, whose livelihood 
depends on doing something on available land, opt to raise livestock or 
grow crops, thereby destroying habitats. In comparison to livestock, 
moreover, sport hunting yields a kind of double-value per animal. This 
is because safari operators receive trophy fees and other remunerations 
while also keeping the meat, either consuming or donating it, whereas 
the economic value of slaughtered cattle is solely in money exchanged 
for meat and skins. Predators and other animals such as baboons, 
which trophy hunters sometimes shoot, are exceptions and not 
consumed. In some cases, jobs are also supplied that would otherwise 
be absent, as with the Makuleke and Zambezi examples. 
As intimated at the outset, it is not our aim to repudiate Regan’s 
inherent value argument [9] or Singer’s anti-speciesist position [12], 
both suggesting that sport hunting is morally indefensible.  However, 
these ideas – like the fortress conservation practices they would imply – 
are ineffectual in regions where people are struggling just to get by. In 
fact, insofar as these positions contribute to the political unpalatability 
of sport hunting, they may reduce conservation outcomes by depleting 
the economic value of wildlife, while simultaneously harming 
desperately poor people. For example, ivory import bans that the 
United States government issued against Zimbabwe due to rampant 
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mismanagement and lack of enforcement lowers the price of elephant 
hunts, with revenues precipitously dropping by half in the case of 
Charlton McCallum Safaris. The price of black-market ivory, however, 
remains unaffected, and the decreased funding from legal hunts 
impedes anti-poaching initiatives and the economic motivations to 
mount them. The ban on rhinoceros horn trade is similarly irrational. In 
this case, it is irrational because horns regrow and can be harvested 
without harm from farmed animals.  Increasing the legal supply, in 
turn, would lower black-market prices and hence incentives to poach.  
The idea in our research is to critically weigh the costs and benefits 
of hunting within a utilitarian framework, and within that framework it 
appears that sport hunting is defensible in certain circumstances, 
namely, those in which it benefits habitats, wildlife and human beings. 
We do not maintain utilitarianism is the only framework and are not 
even necessarily committed to it philosophically, but we do think it is a 
good one if the aim is saving animals and habitats, while improving 
living standards of impoverished people. Leaving philosophical 
standpoints aside, we emphatically believe it is time to ask whether 
hunters and environmentalists dislike wildlife and habitat destruction 
more than they dislike one another, and whether they can accordingly 
find common ground that promotes all their interests, along with those 
of non-human and human populations in effected regions.  
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